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Abstract 
This paper implements a novel experimental design to investigate the presence of order 
effects across multiple valuation tasks for consumer goods, whereby earlier goods are valued 
more highly than later goods. The paper presents a novel explanation of order effects, relating 
to attention and novelty. Typically, multiple valuation tasks for consumer goods use the same 
good for valuation in each task. In this experiment the type of good valued in each task is 
varied, allowing two potential mechanisms to be disentangled: experimental novelty effects, 
whereby participants become less interested with completing later tasks, and good-specific 
novelty effects, whereby participants become less interested with the goods used in later 
tasks. The results find a particular importance of the first task; goods in the first task are 
valued significantly higher than later valued goods, evidence of experimental novelty effects, 
and goods of a similar type to the good in the first task are valued significantly higher than 
goods of a different type to the first, evidence of good-specific novelty. The paper discusses 
the potential implications of these findings. 
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In experimental economics and in stated preference studies, it is common to use designs that 
generate multiple responses from individuals. Multiple responses are an intrinsic part of 
within-subject experimental designs where the aim is to compare individuals’ responses to 
different tasks. They are also essential for the methodology of discrete choice experiments, 
which elicit many binary decisions from each respondent as a means of estimating 
individuals’ valuations of non-marketed goods or services. Multiple-response designs are also 
a useful way of reducing the costs of experimentation by generating multiple data points from 
each participant. However, there is a growing literature which suggests that multiple-response 
designs are vulnerable to order effects: the order in which tasks are presented can affect the 
outcomes of these decisions. These effects are particularly problematic when, as in stated 
preference studies, the aim is to estimate the distribution of preferences in some population. 
Order effects have been found in a number of stated preference methodologies, including 
choice experiments for non-marketed goods (Day and Pinto Prades, 2010; Day et al., 2012), 
contingent valuation surveys for hypothetical environmental goods (Bateman et al., 2004; 
Payne et al., 2000), and multiple-task valuation exercises for real goods (Ariely et al., 2003; 
Clark and Friesen, 2008). Order effects pose a less direct problem when within-subject 
designs are used to make qualitative comparisons between behaviour in different 
experimental treatments, since in these cases, counterbalancing of the order of tasks can be 
used as a control. Even so, the presence of order effects casts doubt on whether individuals 
possess stable preferences that can be elicited through surveys or experiments. Understanding 
why order effects occur is a fundamental problem for experimental economics.  
In this paper, we focus on a specific order effect that has been found in a number of 
experimental studies. This effect is a systematic decline in valuations in repeated selling tasks 
for the same good – a decline that does not occur for buying tasks. This effect has been found 
for marketed and non-marketed goods (Shogren et al., 1994) and for lotteries (Loomes et al., 
2010). Loomes et al. (p. 385) suggest that it may be a result of a reduced sense of loss 
aversion. Their hypothesis is that sellers are reluctant to give up a good in earlier tasks 
(generating relatively high selling valuations), but that repeating the selling task for the same 




not selling weakens. The premise for the present paper is that this order effect may instead be 
a consequence of the reduced attention that participants give to later tasks. 
It is psychologically well established that attention toward an initially novel stimulus 
diminishes over time (Berlyne, 1951; Betsch et al., 1998). In a typical experiment or survey, 
being asked to value goods is initially a novel exercise for respondents, but as task order 
progresses, this novelty value will decline. Previous economic research has found that sellers’ 
valuations of goods are more responsive to variation in the attributes of those goods than are 
buyers’ valuations, and that an increase in attention toward the positive attributes of a good 
can result in an increase in valuations (Carmon and Ariely, 2000; Nayakankuppam and 
Mishra, 2005). Thus, a progressive decline in the novelty of selling tasks might induce a 
decline in valuations. 
If responses to multiple-task experiments are influenced by variations in novelty, it is 
important to understand which dimensions of novelty are responsible for these effects. In 
previous experiments that have found systematic declines in sellers’ valuations across 
repeated valuation tasks, the good that was being valued was exactly the same in every task. 
In such a design it is not possible to determine whether the decline in valuations is a result of 
the reduced novelty of the act of completing tasks in general, or of the particular good that is 
being valued, since both are repeated identically. The experiment reported in the present 
paper attempts to disentangle these effects by manipulating the type of goods valued in each 
task in such a way that the effects of different kinds of novelty can be separated. 
In the experiment, each of the six selling tasks faced by each participant involved a different 
good. The goods used in the experiment were chosen to allow the effects of different degrees 
of novelty to be investigated. The six goods can be partitioned into two subsets, one 
containing three distinct but similar patterned mugs, the other containing three distinct but 
similar luxury chocolate bars.  In this design, the relative novelty of tasks and goods may 
generate order effects in three ways, each of which can be investigated in isolation. A task-
specific experimental novelty effect may occur as a result of reduced attention to the act of 
completing later tasks, independent of the specific goods used. Two kinds of good-specific 
novelty effects are possible. A within-subset novelty effect may occur if participants give 
reduced attention to goods that are similar to goods that have featured in previous tasks. A 
between-subset novelty effect may occur if participants give more attention to the first type of 




The results of the experiment show a general tendency for a decline in valuations over the six 
selling tasks. This decline is especially strong immediately after the first task – evidence of an 
experimental novelty effect. There is also evidence that valuations are higher for the first type 
of good that a participant confronts than for the second – consistent with a between-subset 
novelty effect. These findings suggest that both the general completion of tasks and the 
specific goods used for valuation may be responsible for generating novelty-based order 
effects. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of attention as a 
possible cause of order effects. Section 3 describes the experimental design and Section 4 
outlines the key hypotheses to be investigated. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 
provides a discussion of the implications of these findings. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Explanations of Order Effects 
2.1 Order Effects in General 
Our primary concern is with experimental and survey designs in which each of a sequence of 
tasks elicits a respondent’s valuation of some good (which may or may not be constant across 
tasks). In designs of this kind, order effects are differences between alternative sequences of 
responses. Such designs should be distinguished from designs in which respondents confront 
a sequence of objects and then perform a single task that requires them to rank, rate or choose 
between those objects. In this latter type of design, order effects are differences in responses 
to alternative sequences of remembered stimuli. Findings from research on primacy effects in 
psychology suggests that memory retrieval is particularly strong for the first stimuli (Bruce 
and Papay, 1970), which could induce a tendency for respondents to give higher valuations 
(at the end of a task) to the first goods confronted. Such a tendency might also be induced by 
the perceived legitimacy of first goods as the ‘original’, or by the positive mental imprint that 
first viewed goods leave relative to later goods (Pandelaere et al., 2010, pp. 447-448). 
Memory-based mechanisms can also induce the opposing effect of recency: memories of the 
most recently confronted goods may be particularly retrievable (Murdock, 1962). In a task in 
which a respondents selects the best of a sequence of objects, later objects are subjected to 
fewer comparisons and so are more likely to be chosen (Mantonakis et al., 2009; Sugden and 





Anchoring effects, whereby responses to earlier tasks are used as cues to shape responses to 
later ones, have been observed in many experiments and stated preference surveys, for 
example, in the form of starting point bias (Herriges and Shogren, 1996). Such effects have 
sometimes been found even when previous tasks use entirely arbitrary anchors, such as the 
spin of a roulette wheel (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) or respondents’ social security 
numbers (Ariely et al., 2003), but in valuation tasks they are most robust when the anchor is 
framed as a plausible selling price for the relevant good (Sugden et al., 2013). 
Embedding (or part-whole) effects have been found in multiple-task experiments and surveys 
in which respondents are asked to report valuations of different bundles of goods. If the 
bundles involved in different tasks differ in terms of their position on some objective 
dimension of size, scope or value, the first valuation reported is often relatively insensitive to 
that position. If the first valuation then acts as an anchor for later ones, larger bundles tend to 
get higher valuations if they are evaluated after smaller bundles, rather than before them 
(Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; Bateman et al., 1997; Ariely et al., 2003; Clark and Friesen, 
2008). 
When valuations of a given good are elicited in repeated experimental markets, the valuations 
that are implicit in participants’ bids to buy or sell tend to move towards prices set in 
previous markets, possibly because participants are unsure about the true value of the good to 
them. In a repeated Vickrey second-price auction, such shaping effects can induce downward 
trends in sellers’ valuations (Knetsch et al., 2001; Loomes et al., 2003). 
In some instances, order effects may be generated by strategic bidding which diminishes over 
time as respondents learn about the incentive-compatibility properties of an elicitation 
procedure (Shogren et al., 1994, p.266). In surveys which elicit valuations for non-marketed 
commodities, repeated questions involving different levels or costs of public good provision 
may reduce the credibility of any given level or cost being actually implemented (Carson and 
Groves, 2007, p.185). Fatigue effects have also been shown to present potential issues for 
stated preference choice experiments (e.g. Savage and Waldman, 2008), creating tendencies 
for favouring the status quo or increased randomness in responses (Day et al., 2012, p.75). 
2.2 Novelty-based Order Effects 
In studies of the effects of experience on the well-known disparity between willingness-to-
pay of buyers and willingness-to-accept of sellers, it is common to find a systematic decline 




al., 2010). Theories of attentional bias offer a possible explanation for this effect. These 
theories suggest that individuals tend to give more attention to what they stand to forgo in a 
transaction than to what they stand to gain (Carmon and Ariely, 2000). Since sellers stand to 
forgo a good, it is sellers who focus more on the attributes of goods. If the more an individual 
focuses their attention on the (positive) attributes of a good, the more desirable the good is 
perceived to be, then this may lead to higher valuations by sellers than by buyers. If attention 
falls as task order progresses, then it follows that later goods are perceived as less desirable, 
and so their valuations decline.  
Research from psychology suggests that attention is also positively related to the novelty 
value of a stimulus (Berlyne, 1951; Betsch et al. 1998). The potential significance of novelty 
for economics was noticed by Scitovsky (1992) but, to date, there has been relatively little 
investigation of the role of novelty in economic decision making. There is some evidence that 
novelty increases the appeal of certain kinds of goods (Tom, 2004; Tom et al., 2007) and is a 
cause of increased willingness-to-pay for new variants of recognisable foods (Jaeger and 
Harker, 2005; Stevens and Winter-Nelson, 2008; Meenakshi et al. 2012), suggesting it can be 
responsible for tangible effects on the way that goods are perceived.  
There are at least three mechanisms by which variations in novelty, and corresponding 
variations in attention, might generate order effects in multiple-task surveys and experiments 
which elicit selling valuations. 
The first mechanism is an experimental novelty effect – the reduced novelty of the specific 
experimental methodology as an experiment or survey progresses. With typical lab 
experiments using student participants, or contingent valuation experiments using telephone 
or face-to-face interviews with members of the public, the average participant is unlikely to 
have taken part in many multiple-task studies previously. Thus, earlier tasks are undoubtedly 
more novel to participants, but this novelty may quickly dissipate once participants assimilate 
to the nature of the tasks. The greater novelty of earlier tasks might induce more attention and 
thereby (because of attentional bias towards what is forgone) higher selling valuations. This 
mechanism would tend to induce a general decline in selling valuations, independent of 
changes in the specifics of the task. 
In an experiment eliciting multiple valuations of hypothetical environmental goods, a 
primacy effect has been found: the reduction in valuation between the first and second 




experiment elicited willingness-to-pay for public contributions to a variety of environmental 
goods, but if experimental novelty effects do drive declines in valuations across tasks, it may 
be that primacy effects are even stronger in selling tasks.  
The second mechanism is a within-subset novelty effect. If the goods valued in different tasks 
are similar to one another, then the novelty of the good that a participant is valuing will fall as 
the number of similar goods previously valued increases. This mechanism would tend to 
induce a decline in selling valuations within any given subset of similar goods. 
The third mechanism is a between-subset novelty effect. If the goods in an experiment are 
naturally thought of as belonging to distinct types that differ substantially from one another, 
then the introduction of a new type of good may be perceived as a shift from one type of task 
(for example, ‘valuing chocolates’) to another type (‘valuing mugs’). Since the second type 
of good to be introduced would no longer be associated with the initial novelty of the 
experiment, this mechanism would tend to induce lower selling valuations for later types of 
good than for earlier types. 
In contingent valuation studies, one attempt to rectify issues of order is to employ a method 
of advanced disclosure whereby survey participants are fully informed as to the type of goods 
to be valued before any valuations are elicited. This procedure has been found to dissipate 
some order effects (Bateman et al., 2004; Day et al., 2012). If good-specific (within- or 
between-subset) novelty effects were driving a downward trend in valuations, then it is 
possible that advanced disclosure would reduce this effect, as the initial information about the 
goods to be valued might remove any good-specific novelty that would otherwise be revealed 
at the start of each new valuation task. 
3. Experimental Design 
The experiment reported in this paper was designed to test for novelty effects when 
valuations are elicited in selling tasks. An important feature of the design is its ability to 
isolate the different novelty-based mechanisms described in Section 2.2, while controlling for 
the effects of the other mechanisms discussed in Section 2.1.  
The experiment used a 4x2 between-subject design. In each of the eight sub-treatments, 
participants completed eleven tasks. These were made up of six goods tasks, where 
participants were presented with a good and a valuation was elicited for that good, and five 




3.1 Goods Tasks 
The goods tasks involved the valuation of six different goods separated into two distinct 
subsets, three mugs and three chocolate bars. The use of two different subsets of goods 
allowed within-subset and between-subset novelty effects to be disentangled. 
The three mugs were all white, ceramic mugs, and differed only in the type of pattern of 
shapes printed on the mug (‘Squares’, ‘Circles’ or ‘Triangles’). The three chocolate products 
were all the same luxury brand chocolate bar, differing only by the type of biscuit topping on 
each chocolate (‘Rocky Road’, ‘Milk and Cookies’ or ‘Mississippi Mud Pie’).
1
 Thus, within 
each subset, the three goods differed only in subjective value. That is, they differed only on a 
dimension that was clearly a matter of personal taste, with no connotation of any difference in 
objective quality or market value. In real world individual consumption decision making it is 
common for goods compared for purchase to be identical in terms of price and quality, but to 
differ in terms of some dimension of personal taste, such as colour for items of clothing. This 
feature of the experiment was used to control for embedding effects that might occur if one 
good was perceived as objectively larger than or better than another, and to minimize the 
possibility that participants would use beliefs about market prices as cues for relative 
valuations within each subset. To the authors’ knowledge, there has been no research looking 
exclusively at the effect of order on valuations of private goods that differ only in terms of 
their subjective value. 
The goods used in the experiment were determined in light of a pilot survey, with the 
objectives that: i) within each subset, there should be considerable cross-participant variation 
in preference rankings of the three goods; ii) for most individual participants, differences in 
valuations between goods in the same subset should be relatively small, iii) the types of 
goods used in the two subsets should be substantially different; iv) average valuations of 
goods in the two subsets should be similar to one another.  
Once the experiment began, the procedure was identical across all treatments. Participants 
were told in each goods task that they would be given a good which they then conditionally 
owned, but that they would be able to sell back to the experimenter at a price that would be 
determined at the end of the experiment. A good was distributed to participants, and they 
were encouraged to look at (and pick up) the good to assess it, before making a series of 
                                                             
1The three patterns printed on the mugs were custom-designed for the experiment. The three chocolate bars were 
from a luxury British confectioners (Hotel Chocolat). Detailed descriptions of the goods, which were shown to 




binary decisions designed to elicit the minimum price at which participants were willing to 
sell that good. 
Eliciting selling, rather than buying, valuations was intentional. The experiment aimed to 
manipulate dimensions of the attributes of the goods and their relative novelty value. As 
noted in Section 2.2, previous research suggests that sellers give more attention than buyers 
to the attributes of goods (Carmon and Ariely, 2000, Nayakankuppam and Mishra, 2005). 
Thus, novelty effects are more likely to be found in selling tasks. It has previously been 
acknowledged that the growth of online second-hand markets has increased the frequency 
with which consumers take the role of sellers, as opposed to the more conventional role of 
buyers (Simonson and Drolet, 2004, pp.681-682), suggesting that such a position would not 
be an unfamiliar one to participants. 
A common feature of experiments that exhibit shaping effects, or evidence of strategic 
bidding, is the occurrence of feedback about the outcome of each task (for example, about 
whether the participant has sold the good and if so, at what price) before the next task begins. 
In this experiment, there was no such feedback. A random lottery incentive system was used: 
one of the numbers 1 to 11 was randomly selected, at the end of the experiment. Each 
participant’s earnings were determined by their response to the task that had that number for 
them. This meant that the selected task would either be a goods task or a lottery task for all 
participants, but the counterbalancing of specific tasks within each task type meant that the 
specific good or lottery selected would differ across participants. 
If the selected task was a goods task, the price at which the good could be sold would only 
then be revealed. Thus, there was no possibility for participants’ responses to later tasks to be 
influenced by prices revealed in earlier tasks. Because valuations for each good were elicited 
immediately after the good was shown to participants, order effects could not be caused by 
differences in the strength of memory retrieval over time.  
The downward trends in selling valuations found by Shogren et al. (1994) and Loomes et al. 
(2010) may be the result of a reduced feeling of ownership (and so reduced loss aversion) for 
later goods. In these studies, a market valuation was determined after each round. Participants 
knew the outcome of their decision in each round, and so may have ‘sold’ goods in multiple 
rounds. If participants were frequently ‘selling’ their goods after completing goods tasks, this 
might reduce loss aversion in later tasks. This effect cannot occur in the present design 




experiment, a sense of conditional ownership is maintained for every good. Whilst it is 
possible that there remains a diminished loss aversion that stems from participants simply 
completing multiple goods tasks and thinking about selling, such an effect can be classified 
as an experimental novelty effect – a tendency for participants to give less attention to losses 
as the experiment progresses. 
As noted in Section 2.1, order effects in contingent valuation studies have sometimes been 
attributed to the lower credibility of scenarios that appear later in an experiment or survey. 
Effects of this kind are unlikely in the present design, in which participants report valuations 
for real, private goods and in which the incentive system is clearly defined. 
If participants fail to behave in accordance with expected utility theory, responses elicited 
using a random lottery incentive system may differ from those elicited in single-task designs. 
Existing evidence suggests that this does not induce systematic bias for simple choices 
between lotteries (Cubitt et al., 1998), but that selling valuations tend to be lower in random-
lottery designs than in single-task designs (Loewenstein and Adler, 1995). However, this 
potential bias is not a problem for the present study, which is concerned only with the relative 
valuations of goods across tasks. 
In order to maximise the likelihood of honest valuation decisions of participants, a Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak (henceforth BDM) mechanism (1964) was used. In each goods task, 
participants were shown a set of possible prices, ranging from £0.20 to £6.00, in £0.20 
increments, and were asked whether, at each of these prices, they wished to sell the good 
back to the experimenter at that price, or not to sell. Once all participants had completed the 
valuation decisions for that task, all goods were collected and the experiment continued. This 
was kept the same for all goods tasks. 
The £6.00 upper limit was chosen in the expectation that most participants would value the 
goods less than this. (The market values of the goods, which were not revealed to 
participants, were considerably less than £6.00.
2
) This design choice reduced the possibility 
that participants’ valuations might be framed by the upper and lower bounds of the BDM 
mechanism (Bohm et al., 1997). 
A participant who acted on consistent preferences between money and goods would report at 
most one preference switch, from ‘not sell’ at relatively low prices to ‘sell’ at relatively high 
                                                             
2The retail values of the goods were: mugs- £2.25 and chocolates- £3.15, although pre-experimental surveys 




prices. (There would be no preference switch for a participant who would ‘not sell’ at every 
price or would ‘sell’ at every price). If a participant’s decisions implied more than one 
preference switch, these switches were highlighted on the participant’s screen, together with 
the relevant material from the experimental instructions which reminded them of the 
workings of the valuation mechanism, and gave them the opportunity to revise their decision, 
if they wished to. Participants were free to resubmit decisions with two or more preference 
switches, but this revision stage allowed errors to be corrected. 
If a participant reported no more than one preference switch for a good, the location of that 
switch (or its absence) locates one of thirty-one points on an ordinal valuation scale. For a 
participant with exactly one preference switch, their valuation of that good will be defined as 
the mean of the highest price at which they would ‘not sell’ and the lowest price at which 
they would ‘sell’ (or, equivalently, the lowest price at which they would ‘sell’, minus £0.10). 
Participants who would ‘sell’ at every price will be defined to have a valuation of £0.10, and 
those who would ‘not sell’ at every price to have a valuation of £6.10.  
3.2 Cognitive Distraction Tasks 
In the five lottery tasks, participants were asked to choose which of two monetary lotteries 
they would prefer to play, with payoffs determined by the roll of a die. Lottery task (i) is 
shown as an example in Figure 1, in the form in which it was presented on participants’ 
computer screens. During the experiment, the possible outcomes of the lotteries were shown 
as fractions of X, with participants aware that X could take one of thirty values, from £0.20 to 
£6.00 in £0.20 increments. Notice that the set of possible values of X is the same as the set of 
possible prices in the goods tasks. This X-value lottery design ensures that the two types of 
tasks involve the same reference points, so that comparisons of goods valuations are not 
distorted by values used in the lottery tasks. 
--- Figure 1 near here --- 
Whilst the primary function of the lottery tasks was to act as a cognitive distraction between 
goods tasks, the responses of participants to the lottery tasks revealed risk attitudes and 
possible violations of expected utility theory. The order in which participants completed the 
lottery tasks was counterbalanced across participants, and the position of the lotteries within 
each task was counterbalanced also. All lottery task descriptions can be found in Appendix B. 




Once all tasks were completed, one of the eleven task numbers was then drawn at random to 
determine the task for which each participant would play for real. After this, one of the thirty 
values (from £0.20 to £6.00) was drawn at random, and this was determined to be either the 
price of the good or the value of X in the lotteries. 
If the task drawn for a participant was a goods task, the participant’s decision about whether 
to sell the good at the drawn price was made binding. If the participant was not willing to sell 
the good at the drawn price, they kept the good and took it away with them (in addition to a 
£6 participation fee). If the participant was willing to sell the good at that price, they did not 
take the good away but instead received the drawn price in addition to their £6 participation 
fee. The fact that truthful valuations were the optimal response in the valuation mechanism 
was made clear to participants in both the instructions and the pre-experimental quizzes. 
If the task drawn for a participant was a lottery task, the participant was then shown the 
lottery they had chosen in that task with the value of X equal to the drawn value. An 
experimenter visited them with a die to determine their final payoff, in addition to the £6 
participation fee.  
3.4 Treatments 
The experiment had four treatments (A–D), each of which was subdivided into two sub-
treatments (e.g. A1 and A2). Treatments A, B and C, which will be called the main 
treatments, differ only in the order in which goods in the goods tasks were presented. 
Treatment D uses the same order of goods as treatment A, but adds a control designed to 
remove good-specific novelty from the experimental design. This control uses a method of 
advanced disclosure that has been used in some contingent valuation surveys, in which 
respondents are fully informed about the types of goods to be valued before any valuations 
are elicited (Bateman et al., 2004). In treatment D, before facing any of the tasks, participants 
were shown on their screens images of the six goods to be valued, and were informed these 
would be the goods for valuation in the six goods tasks. The order in which these tasks would 
be presented was not revealed at this stage. (In fact the order was counterbalanced such that, 
for half the participants, the task order reproduced the top-to-bottom-left-to-right order in 
which the goods were initially presented; for the other half, this task order was reversed.) 
In all treatments, the same three different chocolates and three different mugs were used as 




shown in Table 1. M1, M2 and M3 respectively denote the first, second and third mug task 
faced by a participant; C1, C2 and C3 denote the first, second and third chocolate tasks. Within 
each treatment, which of the three mugs (Squares, Circles or Triangles) appeared in which of 
the positions M1, M2 and M3 was counterbalanced, and similarly for the three chocolates. 
Thus, for example, Table 1 shows that in sub-treatment A1, participants faced three tasks 
involving mugs followed by three tasks involving chocolate. Notice that, within each 
treatment, the two sub-treatments counterbalance mugs and chocolates. Thus, for example, 
treatment A can be interpreted as a treatment in which participants face three tasks involving 
one type of good followed by three tasks involving the other; whether mugs are faced first or 
second is counterbalanced. 
The main treatments share the feature that there is either one transition between good types 
(treatment A) or two transitions (treatments B and C). All task orders that are compatible with 
this constraint are included in the design. By imposing this constraint, rather than 
counterbalancing all possible task orders, the design increases the power of tests of within-
subset novelty. (For example, it ensures that for two-thirds of all main-treatment participants, 
the three mug tasks are faced in succession.)  
Considering only the main treatments, each task can be described by four characteristics: 
order (o), within-subset novelty (w), between-subset novelty (b), and good type (g). Order 
takes the form o{1, …, 6}, with o=1, …, 6 referring to the first, …, sixth goods task faced. 
Within-subset novelty takes the form w{1, 2, 3}, with w=1, 2, 3 referring to the whether the 
task is the first, second and third involving a good of the relevant type. Between-subset 
novelty takes the form b{1, 2}, with b=1 referring to a task in which the good is of the same 
type as the good faced in the first task, and b=2 to a case in which it is not. Good type takes 
the form g{0, 1}, where g=0 refers to a task involving a chocolate and g=1 refers to a task 
involving a mug.  
--- Table 1 near here --- 
Thus, for example, the second task in sub-treatment A1 is described by o=2, w=2, b=1, g=1; 
the fifth task in sub-treatment C2 is described by o=5, w=2, b=1, g=0. As a matter of 
definition, these four characteristics are not completely independent of one another (for 
example, o=1 necessarily implies w=1 and b=1). However, the design ensures that the impact 






The experiment took place in early 2016 at the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental 
Social Science Laboratory at the University of East Anglia. The 243 participants were 
recruited through the Centre’s online recruitment system and had no experience of 
experiments which required the multiple valuations of consumable goods. The experiment 
was conducted using the experimental software package z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Ready-
made Economic Experiments) (Fischbacher, 2007). 
The experimental instructions were read aloud and participants had the opportunity to ask any 
questions. Before facing the goods and lottery tasks, participants were asked to answer a set 
of multiple-choice questions to test their understanding of the experimental procedure, 
including questions regarding the BDM valuation mechanism in the goods tasks and possible 
lottery outcomes in the lottery tasks. If a participant answered incorrectly on the first attempt, 
they were asked to review the relevant instructions and attempt the question again. 83.5% of 
questions were answered correctly at the first attempt, and 96.0% were answered correctly by 
the second attempt, suggesting participants in general understood the mechanisms of the 
experimental design. 
4. Hypotheses 
The hypotheses that refer to treatments A, B and C can be formulated in terms of the 
distribution, within the population of potential participants, of valuations Vo,w,b,g, where 
Vo,w,b,g denotes a valuation that is conditional on order o, within-subset novelty w, between-
subset novelty b, and good type g. (Within either good type, the specific good to which the 
valuation refers is to be interpreted as a random draw from the relevant set of three goods.) 
The assumption that participants act on neoclassical preferences implies the null hypothesis 
that the distribution of Vo,w,b,g is independent of the values of o, w and b. As explained in 
Sections 2.2 and 3.4, the experiment was designed to test the following hypotheses about 
novelty effects:  
Alternative Hypothesis H1: Experimental novelty effects 
(a) For all feasible w,b,g: V1,w,b,g > V2,w,b,g > V3,w,b,g > V4,w,b,g > V5,w,b,g > V6,w,b,g  
(b) For all feasible w,b,g, and for all s{2, 3, 4, 5}: (V1,w,b,g – V2,w,b,g) > (Vs,w,b,g – V(s+1),w,b,g) 
Part (a) of this hypothesis predicts that, holding all other factors constant, the later in the 




holding all other factors constant, experimental novelty effects are stronger between the first 
and second goods task than between other pairs of adjacent goods tasks. For example, 
consider sub-treatments A2 and B2. In B2, the first mug task, M1, is the third goods task, 
whereas in A2, the first mug task, M1, is the fourth goods task. Hypothesis H1(a) predicts that 
M1 elicits a higher valuation in sub-treatment B2 than in A2. 
Alternative Hypothesis H2: Within-subset novelty effects 
For all feasible o,b,g: Vo,1,b,g  Vo,2,b,g > Vo,3,b,g 
This hypothesis predicts that, holding all other factors constant, the less novel a good within a 
subset, i.e. the more goods of that subset that have already been valued, the lower its 
valuation. For example, consider sub-treatments A2 and C2. In A2, the fourth goods task is 
M1, i.e. the first task to involve a mug. In C2, the fourth goods task is M3, i.e. the third task to 
involve a mug. Hypothesis H2 predicts that the valuation elicited in the fourth goods task of 
A2 is greater than that elicited in the fourth goods task of C2. 
Alternative Hypothesis H3: Between-subset novelty effects 
For all feasible o,w,g: Vo,w,1,g  Vo,w,2,g 
This hypothesis predicts that, holding all other factors constant, the first good type presented 
has a higher valuation than the second good type. For example, consider sub-treatments A2 
and C1. In both sub-treatments, the fifth goods task is M2, i.e. the second task to involve a 
mug. In A2, the first good type presented was chocolates; in C1, it was mugs. Hypothesis H3 
predicts that the valuation elicited in the fifth goods task of C1 is greater than that elicited in 
A2. 
Alternative Hypothesis H4: Advanced disclosure 
Whilst this is not the primary objective of this paper, it is also of interest to consider how far 
advanced disclosure reduces novelty effects. Hypothesis H4 predicts that within-subset and 
between-subset novelty effects, as predicted by Hypotheses H2 and H3, are less strong in 
treatment D than in the main treatments. 
5. Results 
A total of 243 participants took part in the experiment, but 11 participants reported 




inferred, and so were dropped from the analysis
3
. This left 232 participants in total with 
usable data. 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
It is first of interest to observe valuations across order by treatment. Table 2 reports the mean 
valuation in each of the four treatments, pooling across the two component sub-treatments. 
Figure 2 presents the same data in bar graphs. 
--- Table 2 near here --- 
Pooling treatments A to C, there is an overall downward trend in valuations. A non-
parametric test (Cuzick, 1985) shows that this trend is statistically significant (z= 2.05, 
p=0.040, two-tailed test). This is an extension of a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, testing for a 
consistent trend in differences in the value of a variable across multiple sets of observations, 
where these sets have a natural ordinal ranking. Treatment D shows a similar trend (z= 1.75, 
p=0.080). 
--- Figure 2 near here --- 
5.2 Results: Tests of Hypotheses H1-H3 
Whilst non-parametric analysis enabled a test for overall trends in valuations, parametric 
regression analysis is required to disentangle the different novelty effects predicted by 
Hypotheses H1–H3. Regression analysis also allows for the effects on valuations of 
demographic variables and of responses in lottery tasks to be included (regression results 
including these variables can be found in Appendix E). 
Whilst valuations in this experiment were restricted to not be less than £0.10 or greater than 
£6.10, actual valuations could lie outside these limit valuations (though there were only 6 
participants who chose to not sell one or more of their goods at £6.00). To address this 
econometrically, a Tobit model will be used, with lower and upper bounds set at £0.10 and 
£6.10 respectively. 
                                                             
3Recall that participants were given an opportunity to rectify apparently inconsistent decisions in each goods 
task. If participants still revealed inconsistency after this, efforts were made to allow for human error and still 
record an intended valuation. This was achieved through the following rule: if consistency could be achieved 
through the rectification of one valuation decision, and it was obvious which valuation decision was erroneous, 
then this one valuation decision was rectified and valuation was inferred from these consistent valuation 
decisions. The valuations of two participants (each with inconsistent valuation decisions for two of six goods) 
were amended using this rule. The 11 participants dropped from the analysis either had at least one goods task 
which required more than one valuation decision to become consistent, or it was not obvious which valuation 




Given the potential for the non-independence of valuations at the participant level, a random 
effects Tobit regression model is used. Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates and marginal 
effects of three estimated models pooling treatments A-C. In each model, the dependent 
variable is the valuation Vo,w,b,g reported by a participant in a task with order o, within-subset 
novelty w, between-subset novelty b and good type g. The following independent variables 
are used:  
Order: takes the value o – 1 (i.e. 0, 1, …, 5 for tasks that appear in order 1, 2, …, 6). 
First Task: takes the value 1 when o=1 (i.e. when the task is the first to be faced by the 
participant), 0 otherwise. 
Novelty2: takes the value 1 when w=2 (i.e. when the task is the second to involve a good of 
the relevant type), 0 otherwise. 
Novelty3: takes the value 1 when w=3, (i.e. when the task is the third to involve a good of the 
relevant type), 0 otherwise. 
First Good Type: takes the value 1 when b=1 (i.e. when the task involves the first good to be 
seen by the participant), 0 when b=2. 
Mug: takes the value g (i.e. 1 if the good type is ‘mug’, 0 if it is ‘chocolate’).  
In all three models, valuations are estimated to be £0.42 higher for chocolates than for mugs, 
and this difference is strongly significant (p< 0.001)
4
. 
--- Table 3 near here --- 
Model 1 tests for overall order effects (i.e. general trends in valuations). In line with the non-
parametric test reported in Section 5.1, there is strongly significant evidence of an order 
effect (p< 0.001). Valuations are estimated to fall by £0.05 in each successive task.  
Model 2 drops the assumption that order effects are linear, by including the variable First 
Task which picks up primacy effects. This variable has a strongly significant positive effect 
on valuations (p< 0.001), but its inclusion makes Order insignificant. 
Model 3 includes variables capable of separately identifying the novelty effects predicted by 
Hypotheses H1–H3. After controlling for other effects, First Task remains positive and 
                                                             
4 The models report both the latent coefficient estimates and the marginal effects of the observed (censored) 
values from the Tobit models. Whilst the difference between the two estimated effects is small for each variable, 




significant (p= 0.060); valuations in the first task are estimated to enjoy a premium of £0.20. 
Order remains insignificant; its estimated effect on valuations is virtually zero. Novelty2 and 
Novelty3, which would pick up the within-subset novelty effects predicted by Hypothesis H2, 
are insignificant and have estimated values close to zero. First Good Type, which picks up 
the between-subset novelty effects predicted by H3, is positive and strongly significant (p= 
0.001). Valuations of the first good type to be faced are estimated to enjoy a premium of 
£0.20. 
This analysis supports the following conclusions: 
Result 1 (experimental novelty): Holding other factors constant, there is strong evidence of a 
primacy effect: valuations are higher in the first task than in all subsequent tasks. There is no 
evidence of a decline in valuations after the second task. 
Result 2 (within-subset novelty): There is no evidence of the within-subset novelty effects 
predicted by Hypothesis H2. 
Result 3 (between-subset novelty): There is strong evidence of the between-subset novelty 
effect predicted by Hypothesis H3. 
5.3 Results: Tests of Hypothesis H4 
In the analysis of Hypothesis H4, models 1, 2 and 3 presented in Table 4 were estimated 
using only data from treatments A and D. The order of presentation of goods is identical in 
these treatments, where the only difference between the two treatments is the addition of 
advanced disclosure in treatment D. These models allow a controlled test of the effect of 
advanced disclosure on novelty effects, through the use of interaction variables (of order and 
novelty effects with advanced disclosure)
5
. Whilst order, primacy, between-subset novelty 
and good type variables (and corresponding interaction variables) are defined as before, 
within-subset novelty variables Novelty2 and Novelty3 are pooled as Novelty23 (which takes the 
value 1 when w=2 or w=3, 0 otherwise) to avoid over-identification
6
. 
--- Table 4 near here --- 
                                                             
5 The two orders in which goods were presented at the advanced disclosure stage were counterbalanced across 
participants (see Section 3.4). The regressions reported in Table 4 pool these sub-treatments. There were no 
systematic differences in valuations between them (see Appendix C). 
6
The problem of over-identification arises because, within treatments A and D, there is insufficient 




Model 1 shows a strong and significant interaction effect between advanced disclosure and 
order; whilst valuations only fall by roughly £0.03 in each successive task in treatment A, 
valuations under advanced disclosure in treatment D are estimated to fall by an additional 
£0.07 in each successive task (p= 0.035).  There is no evidence of a significant interaction 
between advanced disclosure and primacy effect in Model 2. The overall interaction between 
advanced disclosure and order effect remains strong and significant (p= 0.034). In Model 3, 
none of the order or novelty interaction variables are significant. Whilst primacy effects and 
within-subset novelty effects were on average reduced under advanced disclosure, order 
effects and between-subset novelty effects actually increased. Thus, contrary to Hypothesis 
H4, there is little evidence that the introduction of advanced disclosure significantly reduced 
novelty effects.  The apparent tendency for advanced disclosure to intensify order effects is 
interesting, but we had no prior hypothesis about this. 
5.4 Other Findings 
We have tested hypotheses about effects of novelty on valuations that are mediated by 
differences in attention, but we have not measured attention directly. A possible indicator of 
attention in our experimental design could be response time – that is, the longer the 
participant takes to complete a task, the greater the scope to give attention to that task. Our 
design allowed a measurement of the time each participant took in completing each valuation 
task. Appendix D reports models of the effects of different forms of novelty on response 
times. The results suggest that response time is significantly affected by novelty in the same 
directions as predicted by the key hypotheses put forward in this paper concerning valuation. 
This supports our interpretation of the novelty effects reported in this paper as results of 
changes in attention given to different goods and tasks. 
Whilst the primary purpose of the lottery tasks was to act as a cognitive distraction between 
goods tasks, they elicited some information about participants’ degrees of risk aversion and 
their propensities to violate principles of expected utility theory (EUT). Summary data about 
responses to these tasks can be found in Appendix B. A large majority of participants 
revealed risk aversion. 53.0 per cent of participants revealed the common ratio effect, one of 
the most commonly-observed violations of the independence axiom of EUT (see, for 
example, Cubitt et al., 1998), while only 4.7 per cent violated that axiom in the opposite 
direction, a discrepancy consistent with other experiments (e.g. Starmer and Sugden, 1989). 




understood the X-value lottery design. Participants’ valuations in the goods tasks were not 
significantly affected by their degree of risk aversion or by their propensities to violate EUT 
(see Appendix E). 
Demographic information, collected in a post-experimental questionnaire, was included in 
additional regression analyses to test if any demographic factors consistently influenced 
participants’ valuations. These questionnaires were optional. Six participants did not answer 
all the questions and so were omitted from the analysis, reported in Appendix E. Gender, 
nationality and previous formal study of economics had no significant effects, but there is 
some evidence that older participants reported lower valuations. The most interesting finding 
was that, in the main treatments, experience of having taken part in previous economics 
experiments had a strong and significant negative effect on valuations (p= 0.028).
7
 
Valuations were estimated to be £0.91 higher for participants who were taking part in an 
experiment for the first time. Adding variables that interacted experience with order and 
novelty revealed no obvious patterns. Viewed in the perspective of an attention-based theory, 
this effect of experience may suggest that, the more frequently participants take part in any 
experiment, the less novel future experiments become, and so the attention participants give 
to the nature of them diminishes, reducing valuations in general. 
Because of the counterbalancing of the order of tasks (see Section 3.4), any systematic 
differences between the valuations of the three goods in each subset would not affect the tests 
of Hypotheses H1–H4. Nevertheless, it is of interest to assess whether there were any such 
differences. Two relevant tests are reported in Appendix F. These tests use data only from 
those participants who implicitly reported a ‘most preferred’ good in a subset (i.e. who gave 
one good a strictly higher valuation than each of the other two). The first test is of whether 
the distribution of first preferences is non-random across goods. The second test is of whether 
the absolute valuations of participants’ most-preferred goods differs according to which good 
is most preferred. No significant differences are found for either test, applied to either subset.  
6. Discussion 
The results reported in Section 5 povide evidence that, when experimental participants face a 
series of tasks designed to elicit selling valuations for different goods, valuations tend to fall 
                                                             





over the course of the experiment. This evidence parallels previous experimental findings 
about the effects of repeating the same selling task. 
By using goods with different degrees of similarity to one another in different orders, the 
experiment was able to disentangle different novelty-based mechanisms that might induce a 
fall in valuations. The treatments without advanced disclosure produce three main results. 
First, there is a strong tendency for participants’ valuations to be higher in the first task they 
face than in subsequent tasks – an experimental novelty effect. Second, in a setting in which 
goods fall into two dissimilar types, there is a strong tendency for valuations to be higher for 
the first type of good faced than for the second – a between-subset novelty effect. Third, there 
is no evidence of within-subset novelty effects. 
This combination of results may seem surprising. Given the known tendency for valuations of 
identical goods to decline as tasks are repeated, one might have expected to find the same 
tendency when goods are very similar to one another. The absence of a within-subset novelty 
effect suggests that apparently small differences between goods – slightly different patterns 
on otherwise identical mugs, different biscuit toppings on otherwise identical chocolate bars 
– can maintain participants’ attention in a sequence of goods tasks. It may be significant that, 
for each good type, these ‘small’ differences were restricted to one attribute of the good. The 
fact that this was the only attribute that varied between the relevant tasks would have made it 
particularly salient to participants. A participant whose attention is focused on biscuit 
toppings on chocolate bars (and who is anticipating the possibility of having one to eat) can 
experience a sequence of ‘Rocky Road’, ‘Milk and Cookies’ and ‘Mississippi Mud Pie’ as 
three distinct novelties. 
In contrast, the between-subset novelty effect suggests that the transition from valuing mugs 
to valuing chocolate bars (or vice versa) induced a reduction in attention. It seems that some 
of the novelty of the first task carried over to later tasks in which the same type of good 
appeared, but not to tasks involving a different type. A possible explanation of this effect is 
that it is a form of anchoring, analogous with the finding of Payne et al. (2000) that when 
respondents sequentially report valuations for each of a given set of public projects, the sum 
of these valuations is influenced by the order in which valuations are made: the higher the 
relative valuation of the good faced first, the higher is the sum of valuations. 
This effect might work through anchoring on valuations: participants might use valuations 




But, given that the effect does not apply across good types (while, as noted in Section 2.1, 
even arbitrary numbers can be anchors for valuations) it is more plausible to conjecture that 
anchoring is on attributes. As explained in Section 2.2, theories of attentional bias explain 
differences between buying and selling valuations as a result of sellers giving more attention 
than buyers to the (positive) attributes of goods. Relatedly, it is possible that the positive 
attention devoted to the attributes of the first valued good then acts as an anchor for 
subsequent valuations. Participants may attend more to the attributes that are possessed by 
that good than to attributes that they experience later. Thus, the initial focus of attention on 
these attributes may spill over to different goods of the same type – that is, goods that share 
many of the attributes of the first good. 
These conjectures receive some support from the results of the advanced disclosure 
treatment. The distinguishing feature of this treatment was that participants saw all six goods 
before facing the first goods task: individual goods tasks were not associated with the novelty 
of learning about a new good. In this treatment, unlike the other treatments but in line with 
previous experiments using identical goods, there was a consistent decline in valuations over 
the six tasks. It may be that advanced knowledge of all the goods made later tasks less 
interesting, reducing the attention that participants gave to them, independent of the good to 
be valued in any particular task.  
7. Conclusion 
In designing and interpreting experiments and stated preference methodologies that elicit 
individuals’ valuations of goods, it is important to understand the mechanisms by which 
participants’ responses to tasks can be affected by the order in which those tasks are faced. 
The experiment reported in this paper is a contribution to this under-researched area. Its 
findings highlight the importance of novelty in mediating order effects, and the potentially 
complex relationships between the novelty of a task and the attention that it receives. In 
economics experiments, the quality of the data typically depends on participants’ engagement 
with and attention to the tasks they face. A fuller understanding of the role of novelty in 
maintaining attention may lead to more effective experimental designs.  
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Figure 2. Bar graphs of valuations by treatment and task order 
 


























  Task Order 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 A1 M1 M 2 M 3 C1 C2 C3 
 A2 C1 C2 C3 M 1 M 2 M3 
        
 B1 M1 M2 C1 C2 C3 M3 
 B2 C1 C2 M1 M2 M3 C3 
Treatment        
 C1 M1 C1 C2 C3 M2 M3 
 C2 C1 M1 M2 M3 C2 C3 
        
 D1 M1 M2 M3 C1 C2 C3 
 D2 C1 C2 C3 M1 M2 M3 
  Task Order  
Valuation (£)  1 2 3 4 5 6 n 
 A 2.53 2.32 2.37 2.36 2.40 2.35 58 
Treatment B 2.60 2.56 1.96 1.93 2.06 2.38 60 
 C 2.29 1.87 1.84 1.74 1.87 1.91 60 
 Pooled A-C 2.47 2.25 2.05 2.01 2.11 2.21 178 




Table 3. Random effects Tobit models of order, primacy, between- and within-subset novelty 
effects on valuation in treatments A-C (lower limit: £0.10, upper limit: £6.10) (standard 









































Order -0.0614 -0.0548 < 0.001 -0.0090 -0.0080 0.662 -0.0083 -0.0074 0.749 
 (0.016) (0.014)  (0.021) (0.018)  (0.026) (0.023)  
First Task ------- ------- ------- 0.3646 0.3255 < 0.001 0.2229 0.1989 0.060 
 ------- -------  (0.094) (0.084)  (0.119) (0.106)  
Novelty2 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -0.0061 -0.0055 0.944 
 ------- -------  ------- -------  (0.088) (0.079)  
Novelty3 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -0.0127 -0.0113 0.903 
 ------- -------  ------- -------  (0.104) (0.093)  
First Good Type ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 0.2291 0.2044 0.001 
 ------- -------  ------- -------  (0.066) (0.059)  
Mug -0.4712 -0.4206 < 0.001 -0.4706 -0.4201 < 0.001 -0.4747 -0.4236 < 0.001 
 (0.054) (0.048)  (0.053) (0.048)  (0.053) (0.047)  
Constant 2.5069 ------- < 0.001 2.3151 ------- < 0.001 2.2301 ------- < 0.001 
 (0.112) -------  (0.122) -------  (0.131) -------  









Table 4. Random effects Tobit models of order, primacy, between- and within-subset novelty 

































Order -0.0312 -0.0284 0.208 -0.0014 -0.0012 0.967 -0.0007 -0.0007 0.994 
 (0.025) (0.023)  (0.033) (0.030)  (0.103) (0.094)  
First Task ------- ------- ------- 0.2072 0.1884 0.164 0.2131 0.1938 0.233 
 ------- -------  (0.149) (0.135)  (0.179) (0.162)  
Novelty23 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 0.0066 0.0060 0.974 
 ------- -------  ------- -------  (0.200) (0.182)  
First Good Type ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 0.0021 0.0019 0.995 
 ------- -------  ------- -------  (0.327) (0.297)  
Mug -0.2336 -0.2123 0.006 -0.2322 -0.2111 0.006 -0.2323 -0.2112 0.006 
 (0.085) (0.077)  (0.084) (0.077)  (0.084) (0.077)  
AD 0.1053 0.0958 0.706 0.1969 0.1790 0.514 0.0617 0.0561 0.908 
 (0.280) (0.254)  (0.302) (0.274)  (0.534) (0.485)  
AD*Order -0.0748 -0.0680 0.035 -0.0997 -0.0906 0.034 -0.0650 -0.0591 0.661 
 (0.036) (0.032)  (0.047) (0.043)  (0.148) (0.135)  
AD*First Task ------- ------- ------- -0.1725 -0.1568 0.420 -0.1521 -0.1383 0.552 
 ------- -------  (0.214) (0.195)  (0.256) (0.233)  
AD*Novelty23 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -0.0179 -0.0163 0.950 
 ------- -------  ------- -------  (0.287) (0.261)  
AD*First Good Type ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 0.1155 0.1050 0.805 
 ------- -------  ------- -------  (0.468) (0.426)  
AD*Mug -0.2102 -0.1911 0.083 -0.2112 -0.1920 0.081 -0.2125 -0.1932 0.079 
 (0.121) (0.110)  (0.121) (0.110)  (0.121) (0.110)  
Constant 2.5119 ------- < 0.001 2.4020 ------- < 0.001 2.3940 ------- < 0.001 
 (0.194) -------  (0.210) -------  (0.372) -------  









Supplementary material (for online publication only) 
 
Appendix A- Descriptions of goods used 










A plain white ceramic mug with printed black triangles. Dishwasher 






















Appendix B- Lottery task descriptions and results 
 
Risk Aversion: Lottery task (i) 
Both options have the same expected payoff, but B involves risk and A does not. Thus, a risk 
averse subject would choose A, and a risk loving subject would choose B. 77.6% of 
participants revealed risk aversion. 
Strong Risk Aversion: Lottery task (iii) 
As the expected payoff of the risky lottery B exceeds the certain value of A, any subject 
choosing A could be seen as strongly risk averse. 28.4% of participants revealed strong risk 
aversion.  
Dominance: Lottery task (ii) and lottery task (v) 
In both tasks, Lottery B weakly dominates lottery A; thus a choice of A would violate the 
principle that preferences over lotteries respect stochastic dominance. In lottery task (ii), 
5.6% of participants violated dominance, and lottery task (v), simply a scaled down version 
of (ii), 2.2% violated dominance. 0.09% of participants violated dominance in both lottery 
tasks. 




Any subject choosing B in lottery task (i), but A in lottery task (iii) would indirectly violate 
dominance. 1.7% of participants indirectly violated dominance. 
Independence Axiom- Common Ratio Effect: Lottery task (i) and lottery task (iv) 
As lottery task (iv) is simply a scaled down version of lottery task (i), the axiom of 
independence implies that choices between A and B should be consistent across the two 
tasks. The choice of A in task (i) and B in task (iv) would represent the common ratio effect 
(Cubitt et al. (1998), for example). 53.0% of participants revealed the common ratio effect. 





























Appendix C- Random effects Tobit model of order, primacy, between- and within-subset 
novelty effects on valuation in treatments A and D (lower limit: £0.10, upper limit: £6.10), 



























Order -0.0312 -0.0284 0.207 -0.0013 -0.0012 0.967 -0.0007 -0.0007 0.994 
 (0.025) (0.022)  (0.033) (0.030)  (0.103) (0.094)  
First Task ------- ------- ------- 0.2072 0.1883 0.164 0.2131 0.1937 0.232 
 ------- -------  (0.149) (0.135)  (0.178) (0.162)  
Novelty23 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 0.0066 0.0060 0.973 
 ------- -------  ------- -------  (0.200) (0.182)  
First Good Type ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 0.0020 0.0018 0.995 
 ------- -------  ------- -------  (0.326) (0.297)  
Mug -0.2335 -0.2123 0.006 -0.2322 -0.2111 0.006 -0.2323 -0.2112 0.006 
 (0.085) (0.077)  (0.084) (0.077)  (0.084) (0.077)  
AD 0.1399 0.1272 0.682 0.2108 0.1917 0.567 0.0898 0.0816 0.890 
 (0.341) (0.310)  (0.368) (0.335)  (0.648) (0.589)  
AD*Order -0.0953 -0.0866 0.028 -0.1146 -0.1042 0.045 -0.0871 -0.0792 0.628 
 (0.043) (0.039)  (0.057) (0.052)  (0.180) (0.163)  
AD*First Task ------- ------- ------- -0.1345 -0.1223 0.604 -0.1039 -0.0944 0.738 
 ------- -------  (0.259) (0.234)  (0.310) (0.282)  
AD*Novelty23 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 0.0038 0.0035 0.991 
 ------- -------  ------- -------  (0.348) (0.317)  
AD*First Good Type ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 0.0920 0.0836 0.871 
 ------- -------  ------- -------  (0.568) (0.517)  
AD*Mug -0.1360 -0.1237 0.357 -0.1365 -0.1241 0.354 -0.1393 -0.1267 0.345 
 (0.148) (0.134)  (0.147) (0.134)  (0.148) (0.134)  
Reverse AD -0.0763 -0.0693 0.850 -0.0343 -0.0311 0.937 -0.0508 -0.0461 0.947 
 (0.403) (0.366)  (0.434) (0.395)  (0.765) (0.696)  
Reverse AD*Order 0.0457 0.0415 0.371 0.0343 0.0312 0.611 0.0463 0.0421 0.827 
 (0.051) (0.046)  (0.067) (0.061)  (0.212) (0.193)  
Reverse AD*First Task ------- ------- ------- -0.0785 -0.0714 0.798 -0.1032 -0.0939 0.778 
 ------- -------  (0.307) (0.279)  (0.367) (0.334)  
Reverse AD*Novelty23 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -0.0459 -0.0418 0.911 
 ------- -------  ------- -------  (0.410) (0.373)  
Reverse AD*First Good Type ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 0.0396 0.0360 0.953 
 ------- -------  ------- -------  (0.670) (0.609)  
Reverse AD*Mug -0.1637 -0.1488 0.348 -0.1644 -0.1495 0.345 -0.1615 -0.1469 0.353 
 (0.174) (0.158)  (0.174) (0.158)  (0.174) (0.158)  
Constant 2.5118 ------- < 0.001 2.4020 ------- < 0.001 2.3941 ------- < 0.001 
 (0.194) -------  (0.210) -------  (0.372) -------  









Appendix D - Response time 
Whilst response time was not intended to be a primary measurement for this experimental 
design, the software used in this experiment allowed measurement of the time that 
participants took to complete each task. The task timer began once all participants had 
received their good in that task and the experimenter commenced the valuation stage on the 
participants’ computer screens. For each participant, the timer ceased when they had 
completed the valuation task and hit ‘Continue’ on their screen. This measure of response 
time may be used as a direct measure of attention across tasks, but with some caveats. First, 
participants received their goods prior to the valuation task (and so timer) beginning. This 
means that response times recorded are only partial measures of the total attention given to a 
good in any given task. Second, participants did not physically receive their goods at exactly 
the same time, meaning that some viewed their good for longer than others prior to the 
valuation task (and timer) beginning. However, since goods were distributed to participants in 
the same order for each goods task, and valuations were compared within-participant, this 
does not present a significant issue. Third, the response time counter provided in z-Tree uses 
only whole seconds, which is less precise than more conventional measures of response 
times. 
These caveats aside, it remains of interest to investigate whether novelty effects as put 
forward in this paper would affect response times in a manner consistent with the main 
hypotheses and findings for valuations. Random effects models of the same independent 
variables as in Table 3 in the main text were estimated with response time as the dependent 
variable. The results of these models, along with equivalent summary statistics as found in 
Table 2 and Figure 2, are presented in Tables D1 to D3 and Figure D.1 below. 
The effects of novelty on response times are remarkably similar to the effects of novelty on 
valuations. In Model 3 of Table D.2 there is strong evidence of a primacy effect, with 
participants spending significantly longer on the first task than subsequent tasks (an 
additional 20.70 seconds, p< 0.001) as well as a persisting order effect causing response 
times to fall in later tasks (1.83 seconds per task, p< 0.001). There is strong evidence that 
participants spend significantly longer on tasks for first goods of a given type than for second 
or third goods of that type (respectively by 10.02 seconds, p< 0.001, and 10.63 seconds, p< 
0.001), evidence of within-subset novelty. There is also strong evidence that participants 
spend significantly longer on tasks for goods belonging to the same good as that in the first 
task (an additional 3.89 seconds, p< 0.001), evidence of between-subset novelty. 
Additionally, Table D.3 reports the results of the effect of advanced disclosure on response 
time. Random effects models using the same independent variables as in Table 4 in the main 
text were estimated with response time as the dependent variable. There is no interaction 
effect of advanced disclosure on any order or novelty variables. However, response time was 
significantly lower in treatment D in general (by 13.04 seconds, p= 0.064), even when 
including all other variables, consistent with the notion that allowing participants to observe 
the goods prior to the tasks beginning did indeed reduce some attention towards those goods 








Figure D.1. Bar graphs of response times by treatment and task order 
 









  Task Order  
Response Time (secs)  1 2 3 4 5 6 n 
 A 69.55 38.74 33.21 41.14 27.83 24.03 58 
Treatment B 71.08 36.05 39.53 28.73 26.52 28.82 60 
 C 64.72 40.02 27.70 27.95 28.25 26.48 60 
 Pooled A-C 68.44 38.26 33.48 32.51 27.53 26.47 178 




Table D.2. Random effects models of order, primacy, between- and within-subset novelty 
effects on response time in treatments A-C 



















Order -6.9460 < 0.001 -2.9572 < 0.001 -1.8348 < 0.001 
 (0.267)  (0.289)  (0.352)  
First ------- ------- 27.9215 < 0.001 20.6973 < 0.001 
 -------  (1.324)  (1.611)  
Novelty2 ------- ------- ------- ------- -10.0237 < 0.001 
 -------  -------  (1.191)  
Novelty3 ------- ------- ------- ------- -10.6293 < 0.001 
 -------  -------  (1.406)  
First Good Type ------- ------- ------- ------- 3.8835 < 0.001 
 -------  -------  (0.893)  
Mug -0.9907 0.278 -0.9608 0.198 -0.9396 0.190 
 (0.914)  (0.746)  (0.717)  
Constant 55.6432 < 0.001 41.0025 < 0.001 44.3325 < 0.001 
 (1.050)  (1.168)  (1.305)  


























Table D.3. Random effects models of order, primacy and between-subset novelty effects on 
response time in treatments A and D 













Order -7.2051 < 0.001 -3.4712 < 0.001 -4.6638 0.002 
 (0.438)  (0.494)  (1.510)  
First ------- ------- 26.1322 < 0.001 18.3707 < 0.001 
 -------  (2.264)  (2.615)  
Novelty23 ------- ------- ------- ------- -8.2112 0.005 
 -------  -------  (2.924)  
First Good Type ------- ------- ------- ------- -3.9788 0.405 
 -------  -------  (4.774)  
Mug 0.6972 0.642 0.7831 0.539 0.8861 0.472 
 (1.497)  (1.276)  (1.233)  
AD -7.8179 0.002 -5.0409 0.079 -13.0381 0.064 
 (2.515)  (2.868)  (7.049)  
AD*Order 1.6765 0.008 0.9114 0.201 1.9971 0.358 
 (0.632)  (0.712)  (2.174)  
AD*First ------- ------- -5.3698 0.100 -0.9818 0.794 
 -------  (3.260)  (3.766)  
AD*Novelty23 ------- ------- ------- ------- 4.1279 0.327 
 -------  -------  (4.210)  
AD*First Good Type ------- ------- ------- ------- 3.6161 0.599 
 -------  -------  (6.876)  
AD*Mug -2.2838 0.290 -2.2226 0.227 -2.2392 0.208 
 (2.158)  (1.839)  (1.778)  
Constant 56.7476 < 0.001 43.0145 < 0.001 54.7015 < 0.001 
 (1.737)  (1.984)  (4.896)  























Appendix E- Random effects Tobit model of order, primacy, between- and within-subset 
novelty effects on valuation by treatments A-C and D (lower limit: £0.10, upper limit: £6.10), 
including lottery task and demographic effects, including interaction variables for all effects 
















Order -0.0104 -0.0092 0.710 -0.0063 -0.0057 0.952 
 (0.028) (0.025)  (0.105) (0.096)  
First Task 0.2287 0.2039 0.074 0.2270 0.2064 0.212 
 (0.128) (0.114)  (0.182) (0.165)  
Novelty2 -0.0007 -0.0007 0.994 ------- ------- ------- 
 (0.095) (0.085)  ------- -------  
Novelty3 -0.0282 -0.0251 0.801 ------- ------- ------- 
 (0.112) (0.100)  ------- -------  
Novelty23 ------- ------- ------- -0.0002 -0.0002 0.999 
 ------- -------  (0.204) (0.186)  
First Good Type 0.2560 0.2283 < 0.001 0.0281 0.0256 0.933 
 (0.071) (0.064)  (0.333) (0.303)  
Mug -0.4685 -0.4177 < 0.001 -0.1845 -0.1678 0.032 
 (0.057) (0.051)  (0.086) (0.078)  
AD ------- ------- ------- 0.0611 0.0556 0.909 
 ------- -------  (0.534) (0.485)  
AD*Order ------- ------- ------- -0.0539 -0.0491 0.719 
 ------- -------  (0.150) (0.136)  
AD*First Task ------- ------- ------- -0.1755 -0.1596 0.498 
 ------- -------  (0.259) (0.235)  
AD*Novelty23 ------- ------- ------- -0.0340 -0.0309 0.907 
 ------- -------  (0.290) (0.264)  
AD*First Good Type ------- ------- ------- 0.1853 0.1686 0.695 
 ------- -------  (0.473) (0.431)  
AD*Mug ------- ------- ------- -0.3009 -0.2737 0.015 
 ------- -------  (0.123) (0.112)  
Risk Averse -0.0096 -0.0086 0.976 0.1132 0.1030 0.772 
 (0.318) (0.284)  (0.391) (0.356)  
Strong Risk Averse 0.1797 0.1602 0.438 -0.4056 -0.3689 0.175 
 (0.232) (0.206)  (0.300) (0.272)  
Dominance 0.5820 0.5190 0.101 0.2112 0.1921 0.715 
 (0.356) (0.317)  (0.579) (0.527)  
Implied Dominance -0.0105 -0.0094 0.990 1.7901 1.6283 0.033 
 (0.801) (0.714)  (0.847) (0.765)  
Common Ratio Effect -0.3321 -0.2961 0.148 0.0696 0.0633 0.825 
 (0.230) (0.204)  (0.315) (0.286)  
Opposite Common Ratio Effect 0.0608 0.0542 0.906 0.2895 0.2633 0.658 
 (0.516) (0.460)  (0.654) (0.595)  
Age 0.0996 0.0888 0.207 0.0026 0.0023 0.981 
 (0.079) (0.070)  (0.106) (0.097)  
Age2 -0.0140 -0.0125 0.014 -0.0080 -0.0073 0.269 
 (0.006) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.007)  
Female -0.1255 -0.1119 0.539 -0.0062 -0.0057 0.981 
 (0.204) (0.182)  (0.262) (0.239)  
Economics 0.2353 0.2098 0.370 -0.0871 -0.0792 0.769 
 (0.263) (0.234)  (0.296) (0.270)  
UK/ Irish Nationality -0.2770 -0.2470 0.202 -0.3263 -0.2968 0.296 
 (0.218) (0.194)  (0.313) (0.284)  
Non-Experience 1.0247 0.9138 0.028 0.7671 0.6978 0.500 
 (0.467) (0.415)  (1.139) (1.036)  
Non-Experience*Order 0.0137 0.0122 0.901 0.0422 0.0384 0.895 
 (0.110) (0.098)  (0.320) (0.291)  
Non-Experience*First Task -0.0123 -0.0110 0.977 -0.2766 -0.2516 0.617 
 (0.429) (0.383)  (0.554) (0.503)  
Non-Experience*Novelty2 -0.0744 -0.0664 0.800 ------- -------  
 (0.294) (0.263)  ------- -------  
Non-Experience*Novelty3 0.1195 0.1066 0.756 ------- -------  
 (0.385) (0.343)  ------- -------  
Non-Experience*Novelty23 ------- ------- ------- 0.0395 0.0359 0.949 
 ------- -------  (0.619) (0.563)  
Non-Experience*First Good Type -0.3208 -0.2860 0.152 -1.0704 -0.9736 0.292 
 (0.224) (0.199)  (1.015) (0.924)  
Non-Experience*Mug -0.1556 -0.1387 0.461 0.1407 0.1280 0.614 
 (0.211) (0.188)  (0.279) (0.254)  
Constant 2.3880 ------- < 0.001 2.6049 ------- < 0.001 
 (0.370) -------  (0.614) -------  
# Obs 1,044 
174 
642 






Appendix F- Tests for systematic preferences or valuations of specific goods 
This table reports the distribution of good type preferences of participants who valued one 
good within a subset uniquely more highly than the other two (thus excluding participants 
who value more than one good equally most highly). The table pools all treatments A-D and 
also separates preferences by first subset of goods. 
Mugs (n) Squares Circles Triangles χ
2
 test p-value 
All 109 32 38 39 χ
2
(2)= 0.790 0.674 
Mug First 68 21 24 23 χ
2
(2)= 0.210 0.902 
Chocolate First 41 11 14 16 χ
2
(2)= 0.930 0.629 
Chocolates (n) RR MC MM χ
2
 test p-value 
All 115 31 36 48 χ
2
(2)= 3.980 0.137 
Mug First 52 12 17 23 χ
2
(2)= 3.500 0.174 
Chocolate First 63 19 19 25 χ
2
(2)= 1.140 0.565 
 
This table reports the mean valuations of the (uniquely) most highly valued goods, by subset. 
The table pools all treatments A-D and also separates preferences by first subset of goods. 
Mugs Squares Circles Triangles Kruskal-Wallis Test p-value 
All £3.28 £2.54 £2.81 χ
2
(2)= 2.701 0.259 
Mug First £3.51 £2.48 £3.02 χ
2
(2)= 3.463 0.177 
Chocolate First £2.85 £2.66 £2.50 χ
2
(2)= 0.119 0.942 
Chocolates RR MC MM Kruskal-Wallis Test p-value 
All £2.99 £3.00 £3.02 χ
2
(2)= 0.006 0.997 
Mug First £3.02 £2.79 £3.20 χ
2
(2)= 1.045 0.593 
Chocolate First £2.97 £3.18 £2.86 χ
2













Appendix G. A copy of the experimental instructions 
Part One  [Provided at the start of the experiment] 
Introduction 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making. Thank you for coming. Please follow along 
as I read through the instructions. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will 
come to answer your question privately. The following instructions are simple, and if you 
follow them carefully you will have the chance to earn money, and other things. What you 
take away from the experiment will be determined by your decisions and by chance. After 
you have completed the experiment you will receive a £6 participation fee, plus the amount 
resulting from your decisions in the experiment. 
Your decisions in this experiment are private, and we ask you not to communicate with others 
during this experiment. It is also important you do not react verbally to outcomes during the 
experiment. If you have any questions during the experiment please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to assist you. Please keep to these simple rules, as anyone breaking 
them may be asked to leave without payment. 
The experiment consists of eleven tasks – six goods tasks and five lottery tasks. After you 
have completed all eleven tasks, one of the tasks will be selected at random. What you take 
away from the experiment will be determined by the decisions you made in that task, and 
only by those decisions. As any one of the eleven tasks might be selected to determine your 
earnings, you should think about each task as if it were for real, and as if it were the only task 
in the experiment. I will now describe the two types of task.  
Goods Task 
At the start of each goods task, you will be given an item which you then own. Before the 
experiment begins you will be shown on your screens all six goods for the six goods tasks. 
You will have the opportunity to choose whether to keep the item or to sell it back to the 
experimenter. You will be shown a list of prices. For each of these prices you will be asked if 
you would be willing to sell the item at this given price or not. 
At the end of the experiment, if a goods task is selected to determine your earnings, one of 
the prices listed will be selected at random. This will be the price that the experimenter offers 
for the item in that goods task. If you have indicated you would be willing to sell the item at 
this price, you will give up the item and receive that price in addition to the £6 participation 
fee. If you have indicated you would not be willing to sell the item at this price, you will keep 
the item and receive no additional money. 
Please note that your decisions in the task cannot affect which price the experimenter offers.  
So when deciding whether or not you are willing to sell at the listed prices, it is in your 
interest to think about each price separately. 
To assist in the explanation of the goods tasks, here is an example. Suppose, after being given 
an item, a participant in the experiment is asked whether or not they would be willing to sell 









An individual with consistent preferences would switch from ‘not sell’ to ‘sell’ no more than 
once. This is because they would not want to sell at any price less than their personal 
valuation of the good and would want to sell at prices greater than this. Here the participant 
has indicated that they are not willing to sell at prices £7.20 and £7.40, but that they are 
willing to sell at prices £7.60 and £7.80. This suggests that the personal valuation of the good 
by the participant is somewhere greater than £7.40, but less than £7.60. If this task was 
selected to determine the participant’s earnings, and if one of the four prices was selected at 
random to be the offer made by the experimenter, the participant’s decision at that price 
would be made binding. 
Lottery Task 
In each lottery task you will be asked to choose one of two possible lotteries.  
At the end of the experiment, if a lottery task is selected to determine your earnings, you will 
play the lottery that you chose in that task. 
The payoff of each lottery will be determined by a roll of a six-sided dice, with each number 
on the dice corresponding to a payoff. The money values of the payoffs will not be known 
until the end of the experiment. At the time at which you are making your choice, all the 
payoffs will be described as fractions of X, where X is some amount of money in the range 
from £0.20 to £6.00 (in £0.20 intervals). At the end of the experiment, if a lottery task is 
selected to determine your earnings, one of these amounts of money will be selected at 
random, and this will then be the value of X in the lottery you have chosen. A roll of the dice 
will then determine the payoff you receive, in addition to the £6 participation fee. 
To assist in the explanation of the lottery tasks, here is an example. Suppose a participant in 






Suppose the participant chooses Lottery A. If the dice rolls a 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6, the payoff is 
equal to the value of (X/3) (i.e. X divided by 3). Suppose the participant chooses Lottery B. If 
the dice rolls a 1 or 2, the payoff is equal to the value of (2*X) (i.e. X multiplied by 2). If the 
dice rolls a 3, 4, 5 or 6, the payoff is equal to the value of (X/6) (i.e. X divided by 6). 
Remember, the value of X is not determined until the end of the experiment. 
Before we proceed, I ask you to answer the short quiz that will follow shortly on your 
screens, to ensure you understand the tasks in the experiment. Please attempt these and feel 
free to re-read the instructions as you do so. If you have any queries please raise your hand 





Part Two  [Provided after all goods and lottery tasks had been completed] 
Determining the Price 
We will now select the price offered in the goods tasks and the value of X in the lottery tasks. 
We explained that X might be any amount of money in the range from £0.20 to £6.00 in 
£0.20 intervals. You may have noticed that in the goods tasks, the possible offers were 
amounts of money in the same range. We will now select one amount of money in this range. 
If the task that determines your earnings is a goods task, this amount will be the price offered. 
If the task that determines your earnings is a lottery task, this amount will be the value of X. 
To ensure a randomly drawn value we will ask one of you to draw out at random one 
envelope from this bag. There are 30 envelopes in this bag. Each envelope contains a card 
showing a different value in the range from £0.20-£6.00 in £0.20 increments.  
The value drawn is ___. Please wait whilst this is uploaded to your screen. Once you have 
seen this, please press Continue. 
Determining the Task 
We will now select the task which will be used to determine what you take away from the 
experiment. To ensure that the task is selected at random, we will ask one of you to draw out 
at random one envelope from this bag. There are eleven envelopes in this bag. Each envelope 
contains a card with a different number in the range from 1 to 11, representing the eleven 
tasks in the order in which you completed them. 
The task drawn is ___. Please wait whilst this is uploaded to your screen. Once you have seen 
this, please press Continue. 
You will now be shown on your screen which task corresponds to the number selected. As 
the task drawn is ___, the task type for all participants should be a ___ task. Once you have 
seen this, please press Continue. 
If your task is a goods task then ___ is now the selling price of the item. On your screen it 
should show you which item corresponds to this task, and your decision at that price. If you 
have indicated you were willing to sell the item at this price then, on leaving the experiment, 
you will receive ___ in addition to your £6 participation fee and will not keep the item. If you 
have indicated you were not willing to sell the item at this price then, on leaving the 
experiment, you will receive the item and your £6 participation fee. 
If your task is a lottery task then ___ is now the value of X in the lotteries. On your screen it 
should show you which lottery you chose in this task and the values of the possible payoffs. 
An experimenter will visit you shortly with a dice to determine which payoff you receive, in 
addition to your £6 participation fee. 
Please wait whilst the experimenter assists in determining final payments individually. A 
questionnaire will be given to you, and it is requested you complete this before taking your 
payment receipt and questionnaire with you to the payment desk upon leaving. Final 
payments and the giving of any goods you are owed will take place at the payment desk on 









We investigate order effects across multiple valuation tasks for consumer goods. 
The experimental design isolates effects of variation in attention and novelty. 
Subjects valued six distinct goods of two different types. 
Goods in the first task faced are valued more highly than good valued later. 
Goods of the first type faced are valued more highly than the other type. 
 
